As online ad offerings become increasingly complex, with multiple size configurations and layouts available to advertisers, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial auction with complementarities. Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to these settings, and truthful combinatorial auctions, such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction, can yield unacceptably low revenue. Core selecting auctions, which apply to combinatorial markets, boost revenue by setting prices so that no group of agents, including the auctioneer, can jointly improve their utilities by switching to a different allocation and payments. Among outcomes in the core, bidder-optimal core points have been the most widely studied due to their incentive properties, such as being implementable at natural equilibria [2, 3] .
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Prior work in economics has studied heuristics and algorithms for computing approximate bidder-optimal core points, given oracle access to the welfare optimization problem [1, 3] . Relative to prior work, our goal is to develop an algorithm with asymptotically fewer oracle calls while maintaining theoretical performance guarantees. Our main result is a combinatorial algorithm that finds an approximate bidder-optimal core point with almost linear number of calls to the welfare maximization oracle. Our algorithm is faster than previously-proposed heuristics, it has theoretical guarantees, and it reveals some useful structural properties of the core polytope.
We take a two-pronged approach to evaluating our core-pricing method. We first consider a theoretical treatment of the problem of finding a bidder-optimal core point in a general combinatorial auction setting. We then consider an experimental treatment of deploying our algorithm in a highly time-sensitive advertising auction platforms.
Theoretical results. Our main result is a quasi-linear time deterministic algorithm for computing bidder-optimal core payments in combinatorial auctions. Our algorithm requires access to an oracle that finds a welfare-optimal allocation for a given profile of (possibly truncated) buyer valuations. In a truncated valuation, the buyer's value for each bundle is reduced by an additive constant; if this causes the value of any bundle to become negative, it is instead set to zero.
Theorem (informal): Given oracle access to a welfare-optimization algorithm (for truncated values), there exists a deterministic algorithm that computes an ϵ-approximate bidder optimal core point using O (n log(n/ϵ )) oracle evaluations and additional time O (n 2 log(n/ϵ )).
Our algorithm searches for a buyer-optimal profile of utilities achievable by an outcome in the core. The set of all such core utilities is a polytope, determined by the (exponentially many) constraints that no subset of bidders can simultaneously improve their utilities. Intuitively, the algorithm proceeds by exploring this polytope. Starting from an arbitrary point in the core, the algorithm attempts to increase bidder utilities, which corresponds geometrically to following a positively-oriented ray until hitting a facet of the polytope. It then determines whether there exists a subset of the bidders whose utilities can be increased while remaining in the core, and if so continues to follow an appropriate ray. This process repeats until a bidder-optimal core point is reached.
This geometric intuition corresponds to a water-filling algorithm, in which the utilities of agents are simultaneously increased and frozen as constraints become tight. Implementing this approach requires an efficient test for inclusion in the core polytope, as well as a method for determining which bidders are involved in a tight core constraint. It turns out that both questions can be expressed as queries to the welfare-optimization oracle, with appropriately truncated valuation profiles. This result is the most technical contribution of the paper, and involves an analysis of the geometry of the core constraints. Given these tests, finding a tight core constraint can be done using binary search (which is what generates the logarithmic factors in our runtime). The algorithm terminates after at most n iterations, since each iteration will freeze the payment of at least one bidder.
Experimental results. We test the performance of our core auction on text ads using the Microsoft Bing search engine. Our dataset consists of around 20, 000 auctions, each containing at most 23 advertisers, with ad sizes ranging from the basic three lines up to fourteen lines. We compare the performance of our core auction against VCG and GSP. Since GSP is technically ill-defined in such combinatorial settings, we consider an implementation of GSP that generates the optimal allocation and charges each ad a price equal to the bid of the next ad in the ordering. Our results show that, due to the complementarity induced by variable length ads, VCG and GSP can lead to significantly lower revenue than core auctions. Our bidder optimal core outcome leads to almost 100% more revenue than VCG and almost 20% more revenue than GSP in our dataset, on average. In our setting, we can implement an optimal welfare oracle with runtime polynomial in the number of ads and the total number of lines of advertising space. We ran our experiments using 20 lines of advertising space. Our algorithm, which makesÕ (n) calls to the welfare oracle, ran in under 55 milliseconds per auction, compared to 11 milliseconds for VCG (which makes n + 1 calls to the oracle) and 3 milliseconds for GSP (which makes a single call to the oracle). While being slower than GSP and VCG, our auction still is faster than blackbox linear programming or running sophisticated iterative heuristics, and it is still in the acceptable speed range for ad-auctions.
